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DIGITAL EFFECTS: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND COMPUTER SEARCHES 
WARRANTS  
© 2014 Ash Moore 
Introduction 
The Fourth Amendment states:  
 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,   
 against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants  
 shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and   
 particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be   
 seized.1  
 
This paper uses the physical computer and the Fourth Amendment to explore the larger concept 
of privacy rights in an increasingly digitized world. Part I traces the origin of the Fourth 
Amendment. Part II follows the Amendment’s development through its almost 300-year history. 
Part III explores how the Fourth Amendment and computers currently relate to one another. Part 
IV puts this paper’s discussion in a modern context and finally, Part V explains why physical 
computers deserve more protection than they currently receive because they now contain more 
“intimate details of the home” than any other object ever imagined. 
I. A Long, Long Time Ago: The Origin of the Fourth Amendment 
 The maxim “a man’s home is his castle” can be traced to the seventh century in 
England.2 But for centuries, this idea centered around protection from private actors, not state 
                                                 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2 David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original Understanding Revisited, 
33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 63 (2005).  
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officials.3 It was not until the late fifteenth century, that the concept began to embrace protection 
from government intrusion as well as intrusion by private actors.4 It was at this time in history 
that home searches and seizures in England increased in frequency and violence.5 As a result, the 
English common law welcomed the idea that some government intrusions into the home were 
unreasonable and therefore, the wronged citizen therefore deserved compensation.6 The 
transition in thought and focus peaked in the 1760s with three famous cases.7  
 The “paradigm search and seizure case for Americans” and the most famous case in 
America in the eighteenth century, revolved around a man named John Wilkes in England.8 John 
Wilkes was a member of the House of Commons and a severe critic of King George III.9 The 
Crown believed he was involved in a published anonymous letter sent to an opposition paper.10 
The letter called the British Tory administration “wretched” puppets and “tools of corruption and 
despotism.”11 The Secretary of State, Lord Halifax, procured a single general warrant while 
attempting to enforce the seditious libel laws against John Wilkes and others.12 
 General warrants were issued ex parte, immunized the government officials who 
executed them from civil trespass, and allowed searches and seizures without any proof of 
individualized suspicion.13 The warrants did not even require the person or the items to be seized 
                                                 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.  
7 Id.  
8 Samantha Trepel, Digital Searches, General Warrants, and the Case for the Courts, 10 YALE J. 
L. & TECH. 120, 122 (2007).  
9 Id.  
10 Steinberg, supra note 2, at 63. 
11 Id.  
12 Trepel, supra note 8, at 122.  
13 Id. at 123. 
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be described. Because of their nature, warrants were often used to suppress political dissent in 
England and the American colonies by authorizing, “searches and seizures of all ‘trunks, studies, 
cabinets, and other repositories of papers’ for evidence of seditious libel.”14 In Wilkes’ case, one 
general warrant was used to search at least five houses and arrest forty-nine people.15 After 
execution of the warrant, Wilkes and his supporters filed at least thirty different lawsuits for 
trespass and false imprisonment.16 In the end, the warrant was declared null and void, the 
government officials were held liable for trespass, and a civil jury awarded Wilkes 4000 pounds 
in punitive damages.17 In addition to the punitive damage judgment, it is estimated that the 
British government spent more than 100,000 pounds defending the lawsuits.18  
 In one of the court opinions, Lord Camden stated, “the great end for which men entered 
society, was to secure their property.”19 Further, “that right is preserved sacred and 
incommunicable in all instances.”20 The only time property rights could be abridged were by 
laws passed for the public good.21 These laws only included those for “distresses, executions, 
forfeitures, and taxes.”22 Camden reiterated that in English common law, “‘every invasion of 
private property, be it ever so minute,’ was considered a trespass.”23 He believed this premise “is 
proved by every declaration in trespass where the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising 
                                                 
14 Id.  
15 Steinberg, supra note 2, at 63. 
16 Id.  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
19 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1031, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765). 
20 Id.  
21 Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or 
Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 310 (1998). 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  
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grass and even treading upon the soil.”24 The burden was on the trespasser to justify or excuse 
his action.25 Camden believed that allowing the government’s actions “would be subversive of 
all the comforts of society.”26 But he also took time to distinguish the government’s right to enter 
the home to seize stolen goods and a few other instances by further referencing property rights.27 
Camden was able to distinguish those situations.28 He did so by differentiating the government’s 
property rights in the items to be seized.29 However, when the object of the warrant was a private 
paper, as in the instant case, the government had no property interest in the papers and therefore 
no right to search for them or seize them.30  
 As a final note, Camden referenced the right against self-incrimination and said, “the law 
obligeth no man to accuse himself... and it would seem that search for evidence is disallowed 
upon the same principle.”31 This is what became known as the Mere Evidence Rule. Searches for 
profits of crime were allowed because the government had a property interest in those objects.32 
On the other hand, the government could not search for “mere evidence” of a crime because the 
government obtained no property interest in private effects simply because they were somehow 
related to criminal activity of the owner.33  
                                                 
24 Id. at 311.  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Id.   
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
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 At the same time John Wilkes and his supporters were driving change in England, 
Charles Paxton was involved in a similar controversy in the American Colonies.34 Paxton was a 
customs officer who went to renew a writ of assistance in the Superior Court of Boston in 
1761.35 A writ of assistance was a specialized form of general warrant.36It authorized British 
custom officers to enter establishments, including homes, without suspicion, to search for 
untaxed goods (most commonly, tea and sugar).37 Beyond this basic blanket of authority, the 
writs also allowed officials to commandeer peace officers and ordinary citizens to aid in searches 
under the writs.38 However, unlike general warrants, the writs did not immunize the government 
officials from liability if they failed to uncover evidence of a crime.39 In spite of this, American 
colonists often found themselves suffering abuses under the writs, and over time, general 
resentment toward the writs grew.40  
 As a result of the growing resentment, when Paxton went to renew his writ, an 
association of merchants in Massachusetts opposed the renewal in court.41 A renowned Boston 
attorney named James Otis represented the merchants and argued that freedom from government 
intrusion in one’s own home was “among the most essential branches of English liberty.”42 He 
furthered his argument against the writs of assistance by stating those instruments allowed 
officials to “enter our houses when they please...break locks, bars, and every thing in their way - 
                                                 
34 Steinberg, supra note 2, at 64. 
35 Id.  
36 Trepel, supra note 8, at 122. 
37 Id.  
38 Id.   
39 Id. 
40 Id.  
41 Steinberg, supra note 2, at 64. 
42 M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 334 (1978).  
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and whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire.”43 Around the 
same time Otis opposed Paxton in the courtroom, resentment towards the writs reached a 
breaking point as American colonists violently opposed the Stamp Act in 1761 with a series of 
riots in the streets.44 
 It was just a little over a decade later when the First Continental Congress met.45 When 
the discussion turned to oppressive British action, the focus was mostly on official searches of 
homes.46 A couple years before, Samuel Adams, vehemently criticized writs of assistance for 
allowing such oppressive searches.47 He said, “Our homes and even our bedchambers are 
exposed to be ransacked, our boxes and chests and trunks broke open and plundered by 
wretches.”48 It was this sentiment, this fear and outrage, that was repeated at the Continental 
Congress. And it was this sentiment that lead to the Fourth Amendment.49 
II. Moving On Up: The Evolution of the Fourth Amendment 
 The first time the Supreme Court confronted the limits and protections of the Fourth 
Amendment, it gave the Amendment a liberal construction. This action was based on a fear that a 
strict construction would allow the government to elevate form over substance and find 
loopholes in procedure to commit unconstitutional practices.50 The issue before the Supreme 
Court, that allowed them to lay the foundation for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, revolved 
                                                 
43 Id. 
44 Trepel, supra note 8, at 122. 
45 Steinberg, supra note 2, at 66. 
46 Id.  
47 Id.   
48 Id.  
49 Id.  
50 Clancy, supra note 21, at 313. 
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around a failure to pay taxes on thirty-five cases of plate glass.51 In the case, the defendant was 
subjected to a court order to produce invoices that the government believed would help prove an 
element of the case against the defendant.52 The order was issued pursuant to a provision in a 
customs revenue act.53 The provision of the act did not allow for searches and seizures, but 
simply required defendants to produce incriminating papers.54 However, if a defendant failed or 
refused to produce the papers, the Court treated the fact the government was seeking to prove by 
the papers as admitted by the defendant.55 
 The Court found violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in compelling the 
production of private papers.56 While the Court admitted that no search or seizure was authorized 
under the Act or in the immediate case, the effect of compelled production was substantially the 
same as the evils the Fourth Amendment sought to combat.57 The Court pointed out that the only 
difference was the lack of “aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure” like forcible entry 
in to a home.58 The Court announced, “it is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of 
his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”59 
 Even though the Court called property rights and a man’s security in them sacred, the 
Court still upheld searches in other contexts based on a property theory.60 The government could 
                                                 
51 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617 (1886).  
52 Id. at 618.  
53 Id. at 617.  
54 Id. at 621. 
55 Id. at 618.  
56 Id. at 621.  
57 Id.  
58 Id. at 622.  
59 Id. at 630. 
60 Id. at 623. 
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enter homes to search for stolen goods, goods a person had failed to pay taxes on, and in other 
listed situations based on the concept of superior property rights to the goods themselves.61 The 
government or an individual who the government was acting on behalf of had a superior right to 
the items and it was this right that permitted intrusion.62 In the case of private papers however, 
the Court said they are the owner’s “dearest property” and not subject to any other property 
interest.63 
 In writing the opinion, Justice Bradley believed he was affecting the “very essence of 
constitutional liberty and security.”64 He believed the principles announced applied to “all 
invasions on the part of the government...of the sanctity of a man’s house and the privacies of his 
life.”65 The broad constitutional principles illustrated in the case became the foundation of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and even though much of the case has been overruled, the 
Supreme Court still often returns to it when seeking inspiration for modern Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rulings.66 
 In all the ways Boyd was broad and aspirational, Olmstead67 was limiting and practical. 
In that case, government officials placed a wiretap on phone lines while investigating suspected 
violations of the National Prohibition Act.68 The government uncovered a conspiracy of 
“amazing magnitude” and ultimately tried to introduce the contents of the intercepted telephone 
                                                 
61 Id.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 627.  
64 Id. at 630.  
65 Id.  
66 Clancy, supra note 21, at 313. 
67 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  
68 Id. at 455.  
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conversations at trial.69 The introduction was challenged by the defense and the case ultimately 
reached the Supreme Court, who was left to decide if the Fourth Amendment protected 
intercepted phone conversations.70  
 The Court announced that the Fourth Amendment only protected material things (i.e. 
persons, houses, papers, and effects).71 Effects included things like letters, but where as in the 
instant case, “evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only” and there 
was no entry in to a home or office, no search or seizure occurred.72 While the Court 
acknowledged the Amendment deserved liberal construction and broad interpretation, it refused 
to “justify enlargement of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of 
houses, persons, papers, and effects.”73 Ultimately, the Court only narrowed the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment to material objects. Additionally, the Court’s final decision also only 
safeguarded those objects from physical intrusions. 
 However, despite the majority opinion and the ruling in the case, it is the dissent, written 
by Justice Brandeis, that has become a staple of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and 
analysis.74 Justice Brandeis reminded the Court that they must never forget “it is a Constitution 
we are expounding,” as the revered Chief Justice John Marshall once warned.75 “[Constitutions] 
are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of 
Chief Justice Marshall, ‘designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can 
                                                 
69 Id. at 457.  
70 Id. at 455.  
71 Id. at 464.  
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 465.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 472.  
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approach it.’”76 Because of this, Brandeis said, it was imperative to consider not only what was, 
but what may be.77 He observed that changing times had yielded new and farther-reaching means 
of invading privacy and he predicted that some day technology may give the government tools to 
reproduce sensitive documents in court without having to remove them from private drawers or 
even enter the homes of private citizens.78 These beliefs about the nature of Constitutions and 
predictions for the future caused Brandeis to chastise the Court and warn against too literal a 
construction.79 He warned that, “rights declared in words might be lost in reality.”80 
 It was not until almost forty years after the majority’s narrowing of the Fourth 
Amendment and Brandeis’ warning in Olmstead, that the Supreme Court handed down what has 
become the leading case in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.81 That case presented a second 
challenge to a wiretap by law enforcement officers, this time on the outside of a public phone 
booth.82 There, the Court refused to transform the Fourth Amendment into a general 
constitutional ‘right to privacy,’83 but it nonetheless transformed Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The majority proclaimed that, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places 
[and] what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”84 On the other hand, “what [a man] seeks to preserve 
                                                 
76 Id.  
77 Id. at 473.  
78 Id. at 474.  
79 Id.  
80 Id. at 473.  
81 Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the 
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 815 (2004) [hereinafter Kerr, Fourth Amendment].  
82 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).  
83 Id. at 350.  
84 Id. at 351.  
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as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”85 The 
Court expressly rejected a Fourth Amendment analysis that would depend on the presence or 
absence of a physical intrusion into anything construed as a “constitutionally protected area,” 
whatever that may be.86  
 This opinion transformed Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by rejecting what scholars 
call the property-based theories.87 Another case was decided within months of Katz, which 
rejected another aspect of the property-based theories, leading to what scholars believed to be 
their total demise.88 The Court came to believe that the emphasis of Fourth Amendment 
protection needed to shift its emphasis from property to privacy rights due to advancements in 
technology and “a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform.”89 Because of this, the 
Katz court believed Fourth Amendment protections were no longer limited to tangible property 
and property interests did not control whether a search or seizure had occurred.90 But as with 
Olmstead, it is not the majority opinion in Katz that has endured. Subsequent to the ruling in 
Katz, Fourth Amendment analyses began to take place under a two part “reasonableness” test, 
announced by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion:91 First, a person must exhibit an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy; second, that expectation must be one that society recognizes 
as “reasonable” (objective).92 
                                                 
85 Id.  
86 Id. at 353.  
87 Clancy, supra note 21, at 320. 
88 Id.  
89 Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).  
90 Clancy, supra note 21, at 328. 
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
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 It was this reasonableness test that governed Fourth Amendment protection when a 
defendant challenged law enforcement’s use of a thermal imager aimed at his home.93 Law 
enforcement officers believed the defendant was growing marijuana in his home in large 
quantities.94 Since this process would require a significant amount of high-intensity grow lights, 
the officers stood on a public street and pointed a thermal imager at the defendant’s home to 
determine if there was an abnormal amount of heat emanating from it.95 The defendant 
challenged action as an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.96  
 The Court began its analysis by repeating a previously announced determination that, “at 
its core,” the Fourth Amendment protects “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”97 On one hand, the Court cited Boyd 
and reiterated that, “the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass.”98 It was this 
rationale that always prevented the Court from requiring law enforcement officers to “shield 
their eyes when passing the home on public thoroughfares.”99 On the other hand, the Court 
pointed out that this was more than naked-eye surveillance and the issue was therefore how 
much technological enhancement of ordinary perception is too much from certain vantage 
points.100 
                                                 
93 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
94 Id. at 29.  
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 30.  
97 Id. at 31 (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).  
98 Id. at 32.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 33.  
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 The Court concluded that the advancement of technologies had affected reasonable 
expectations of privacy in the home and elsewhere.101 It pointed out that pervious decisions had 
shown advancements in aviation had exposed areas of the home to the public in lawful airspace 
when those areas were previously private.102 But the Court also felt there must be a limit to the 
“power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”103 Ultimately the Court ruled 
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology information regarding the interior of the home that 
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion in to a constitutionally 
protected area’ constitutes a search - at least where (as here) the technology is not in the general 
public use.”104 The Court noted that the quality or quantity of the information gathered was 
completely irrelevant to the analysis because “physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by 
even a fraction of an inch,’ was too much” and there is no warrant exception for “the officer who 
barely cracks open the front door and sees nothing but the non-intimate rug on the vestibule 
floor.”105 In fact, the Court said case law makes it clear that all details of the home are intimate 
details, because the entire area is supposed to be shielded from the government.106 
 Finally, recently the Supreme Court clarified that the property-based theory is not as dead 
as the critics claim. In the case at issue, law enforcement officials attached a GPS tracking device 
to the undercarriage of the defendant’s car and introduced the location data collected at his 
subsequent trial for conspiracy to distribute drugs.107 The Supreme Court found a Fourth 
Amendment violation due to the fact that the GPS device illegally (it was a trespass) occupied a 
                                                 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 34.  
103 Id.  
104 Id. at 34.  
105 Id. at 37.  
106 Id.  
107 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).  
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private effect (i.e. the car) belonging to the defendant.108 The Court pointed out that this would 
have been a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.109 
 The Court traced the development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and noted the 
Amendment’s text revealed a close connection to property; It was this understanding of the 
language that led the Court to tie protections to common-law trespass concepts until the latter 
half of the twentieth century.110 The Court confronted the “reasonable expectation of privacy” 
test announced in and followed after Katz but ruled that the instant case was not controlled by 
it.111 Instead, the Court clarified that the Katz’s ruling simply established that property rights are 
not the sole measure for Fourth Amendment violations.112 In addition, the Katz expectation of 
privacy test could never be used to diminish the protections the Fourth Amendment guaranteed 
when it was adopted and for this reason, the Katz test simply adds to, but is not substituted for, a 
common-law trespassory test.113 The expectations of privacy protected under Katz are ones that 
have their source outside of the Fourth Amendment “either by reference to concepts of real or 
personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.”114 
 As technology has advanced to allow searches that would have required physical 
intrusion at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the Supreme Court has struggled to 
fashion tests, rules, and exceptions to them that protect individuals from governmental 
oppression. Physical trespass has always been the easiest way to determine if a search has 
occurred. But even though jurisprudence has necessarily expanded Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
108 Id. at 949.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 950.  
112 Id. at 951. 
113 Id. at 952. * 
114 Id. at 951.  
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protections as the nature of sensitive information and access to intimate details have begun to 
take on forms not contemplated by the Framers, the original protections have not changed. 
Physical intrusion is still a touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis and the Katz test is utilized 
only when it is necessary to find a Fourth Amendment violation to uphold the intent of the 
Amendment in the absence of such an intrusion. 
III. The Computer and the Fourth Amendment 
 Courts have failed at universally conceptualizing computers for the purpose of Fourth 
Amendment analysis.115 The most common conception is to view a computer as a container that 
holds numerous subcontainers of information (i.e. a filing cabinet).116 This view causes the 
computer to be treated more like a “place” than a “thing” (i.e. effect) for the purposes of Fourth 
Amendment analysis.117 Each folder or file is a distinct effect and therefore each folder or file 
requires its own Fourth Amendment justification before it can be legally searched.118 When 
individual files or folders are considered separate “things” to be searched, as in this sub-
container perspective, Courts have struggled with determining the limits of searches authorized 
by computer warrants.119 In the past, lines have been drawn between encrypted and non-
encrypted files as well as between password-protected user accounts.120  
 Another court-accepted treatment of the computer treats the object like other containers 
under Fourth Amendment law.121 However, this view rejects the idea that the computer contains 
                                                 
115 Trepel, supra note 8, at 120.  
116 Josh Goldfoot, The Physical Computer and the Fourth Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 
112, 118 (2011).  
117 Id. at 119.  
118 Id. at 119-20.  
119 Id. at 119.  
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 113.  
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separate “subcontainers” and instead views the whole computer hard drive as one effect.122 This 
view removes any limitations and restrictions necessitated by the aforementioned subcontainer 
perspective. As long as the computer is lawfully seized, any file may be viewed.123 
 The main problem with both these perspectives is the unique nature of computer hard 
drives.124 While computers are frequently analogized to filing cabinets to justify the container 
and subcontainer perspectives, some judges have refused to accept this analogy because 
computers are capable of storing much more information, a variety of ways, than any traditional 
filing cabinet was or is capable of doing.125 Due to this observation, some judges insist that 
computers must be treated differently than any other container under the Fourth Amendment.126 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court once distinguished containers based on type but quickly 
abandoned such an approach because it was impractical and there was no basis for any 
distinctions in the language of the Fourth Amendment.127  
 However, unique concerns presented by the nature of computers have led some courts to 
create a “special approach” for searching computers in spite of a lack of precedent.128 One thing 
courts try is to impose ex ante restrictions.129 An ex ante search requires a judge to pre-approve 
specific steps that limit the search.130 This could include limiting a search by a file names or 
                                                 
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A 
Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 202 (2005).  
125 Id. at 203.  
126 Id. at 216.  
127 Id. at 216-17.  
128 Id. at 202.  
129 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 571 (2005) 
[hereinafter Kerr, Searches and Seizures]. 
130 Id.  
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types on a computer.131 For physical searches, judges leave the details and methods of a search 
up to the discretion of the officers who execute the warrant.132 The only review that occurs is ex 
post, not ex ante, and it is a broad judicial review to ensure only that the methods were 
reasonable.133 The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this approach for physical searches.134 
 Two circuit courts have addressed ex ante restrictions on search warrants.135 In both 
cases, the courts had to address the problem of intermingled documents.136 In one case, the 
government seized several boxes of documents and took them off site to search them later.137 
The boxes included documents that were evidence of criminal activity, but they also contained 
hundreds of other innocuous documents of a personal nature.138 When the seizure was 
challenged, the government argued that it would have been nearly impossible to search through 
all the documents on the site.139 While the court upheld the constitutionality of the search, it 
“suggested” that in future cases, law enforcement should seek prior judicial approval for the 
“wholesale removal” of such a large quantity of documents.140 The hope is that the over-broad 
seizure is monitored by a neutral and detached magistrate and is approved only in cases where it 
is justified by particular concerns.141 
                                                 
131 Clancy, supra note 124, at 206.  
132 Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 129, at 571.  
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 75, 104 (1994).  
136 Id.  
137 United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 595 (9th Cir. 1982).  
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 595-96.  
140 Id.  
141 Id.  
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 Twelve years after the above case was decided, scholars began to urge courts to apply the 
“Tamura rule” to computer searches.142 It is not possible to physically separate information 
stored in a computer so searches of a computer will inevitably involve intermingled 
documents.143 However, while the Tamura case only asks that law enforcement officials request 
prior approval for the wholesale removal of numerous intermingled documents, the “Tamura 
rule” scholars asked the courts to apply to computer warrants included a new requirement that 
the warrants relate specific search protocols to explain how the officer will sort through the 
documents on a computer and gather evidence.144 The reasoning behind this addition was that 
the Tamura rule was premised on exigent circumstances to prevent the destruction of 
evidence.145 However, once computers are taken by law enforcement, the exigency passes and 
law enforcement officers should not be allowed to look through computers any way they want 
and at their own pace.146 Even though this method truly originated in a law review article and not 
in a previous court case, one court relied on it when it handed down an ultimately influential 
case.147 
 In that case, an officer searched a computer pursuant to a search warrant that authorized 
him to look for evidence relating to a drug offense.148 While he was searching however, the 
officer found child pornography.149 The officer abandoned the search for drug evidence and 
                                                 
142 Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 129, at 572. 
143 Winick, supra note 135, at 105.  
144 Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 129, at 572. 
145 Winick, supra note 135, at 106.  
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 573.  
148 Carey & United States v. Gary, 172 F.3d 1268, 1270-71 (10th Cir. 1999). 
149 Id. at 1276.  
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began searching for more images of child pornography.150 The government argued that the 
additional images found fell under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.151 
Ultimately, the court decided that the search for additional images was improper and beyond the 
scope of the warrant.152 The court said, “where officers come across relevant documents so 
intermingled with irrelevant documents (i.e. computer hard drives) that they cannot feasibly be 
sorted at the site, the officers may seal or hold the documents pending approval by a magistrate 
of the conditions and limitations on a further search through the documents.”153 The court further 
said that reliance on analogies to other closed containers may lead courts to “oversimplify a 
complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern 
computer storage.”154 In a case following the one above, the same circuit made it clear that the 
“special approach” it condoned was one that may require “an intermediate step of sorting various 
types of documents.”155 
 Despite this method’s popularity, commentators have almost uniformly criticized it.156 
The first is the fact that it requires ex ante restrictions when courts have explicitly rejected this 
approach in other contexts.157 The second concern is about the general nature of computer 
searches that the method tries to avoid.158 When the Tamura rule was first applied to computers, 
the average home computer could only store the equivalent of around 100,000 typewritten 
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pages.159 Today however, common computers can store the equivalent of over forty million 
typewritten pages.160 That is over 800 times the storage capacity in less than thirty years. Finally, 
the last criticism is that the Tamura method assumes file names accurately reflect the contents.161 
 Due to these concerns, other courts have developed their own “special approach” 
methods. Some courts interpret the particularity requirement for warrants to require the specific 
evidence sought and not merely the computer hardware.162 Other courts require warrants to state 
the purpose the computer is being seized for.163 At least one court treats folder labels (but not 
their contents) as being in plain view.164 Finally, some courts require officers to use advanced 
search tools when those tools are sufficient to capture the sought after evidence.165 This list does 
not represent an exhaustive illustration of all the methods employed by courts, however, as the 
methods courts use are almost as numerous as the courts themselves.166 
 These struggles, coupled with other advancements in technology, later interpretations of 
the Katz case, and the original intent of the Fourth Amendment, have led scholars to believe the 
Fourth Amendment is incapable of protecting privacy interests in the modern society.167 As a 
result, additional privacy protections have been developed, mostly by Congress, to fill the gap 
between the Fourth Amendment protections and what reasonable people want and expect.168 The 
beginning of this understanding came with wiretapping technology. As the history of the Fourth 
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Amendment (discussed above) relates, wiretapping technology made the Supreme Court change 
its understanding of the law and technology and how the two intertwine. While the Court 
originally failed to recognize that the Fourth Amendment should regulate wiretapping 
technology, it eventually understood the importance of the technology.169 As a result, it 
ultimately constitutionalized and effectively regulated the practice with subsequent cases.170  
 When cases made it clear wiretapping was constitutional within certain bounds, Congress 
immediately took over and passed several statutes.171 These included the Federal Wire 
Interception Act, the Electronic Surveillance Control Act, and the Federal Wiretap Act.172 The 
latter of which (also known as Title III) is still the governing law today.173 The acts themselves 
were challenged in court but because they incorporated the teachings of the Supreme Court cases 
decided around the same time, they survived constitutional scrutiny.174 Today, the act of 
wiretapping is controlled by a federal statutory scheme, and not the Fourth Amendment or the 
courts.175 So, if a wiretap is challenged today, it is challenged on statutory grounds.176 
 Wiretapping is not the exception when it comes to new technologies and privacy 
protections.177 In most cases of new technology and individual rights, congress has acted quickly 
and decisively leaving only a secondary role for the courts and the Fourth Amendment.178 At 
times, Congress has acted in response to Supreme Court decisions. For instance, when the 
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Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not protect pen register information 
(numbers dialed from telephones), Congress passed a law doing just that.179 At other times, 
Congress has acted on its own without any spurring from the courts. Without any legal 
challenge, Congress passed the Privacy Act of 1974 that allows citizens to check and correct 
information about themselves in government databases.180 With this practice as a reference, it is 
all the more notable that the courts have been left to struggle with the problems with computer 
search warrants.  
IV. Back to the Future: Modern Context for Fourth Amendment Analysis 
 As early as 1890, Judges and Justices began struggling with technology and privacy 
rights.181 When considering the Kodak camera and the tabloid press, Justice Brandeis and 
Samuel Warren opined, “Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious but has 
become a trade.”182 In addition, it was over forty years ago that the United States Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare (renamed the Department of Health and Human Services in 
1979) investigated looming threats to individual privacy.183 The agency concluded that one of 
the most dangerous threats was accumulated personal information located in computerized 
federal databases.184 However, it was not until twenty years later that instantaneous information 
storage and transfer on a massive scale became possible and profitable due to computer 
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technology.185 Once technology was advanced enough to make the collection of personal 
information profitable, private companies began storing and transferring massive amounts of 
data in the same manner in which government agencies had previously employed.186 This gave 
rise to the term “Little Brother” playing off of George Orwell’s famous depiction of an 
omniscient and oppressive government embodied in “Big Brother.”187 Therefore, the information 
industry had a huge effect on turning sacrosanct pieces of private information in to little more 
than a Wall Street commodity.188 And when the Internet came along, the process of data 
collecting was streamlined to the point where private companies and government agencies could 
exponentially increase the volume of information contained in vast and numerous databases.189  
 The Internet, at the most basic level, is the largest computer in the world.190 Almost 
fifteen years ago a computer technology company Chief Executive Officer famously said, “You 
have zero privacy [on the internet]. Get over it.”191 But the Internet deserves credit for more than 
just possibly causing the “death of privacy.”192 It is also responsible for the digitization of 
expression that has been called “the end of forgetting.”193 It is estimated that the average social 
media user creates seventy pieces of content each month.194 Once created, this content exists 
infinitely in cyberspace and even if it is “deleted” technologically savvy people can almost 
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always still find it somewhere in the dark corners of the web.195 In a 2010 study conducted by 
Microsoft, seventy-five percent of employers required online research in to applicants that 
covered social media, online gaming, blog, and photo and video sharing sites.196 But the Internet, 
like physical computers, stores more than consciously created information.197 Other Internet 
(especially social media) users can create content about a person he or she has no knowledge 
about or control over.198 In addition, web sites track and store the metadata similar to physical 
computers.199 At the very least, this data includes information about how many times and how 
long a specific user visits a site..200 
 In mid-2013, Edward Snowden became the biggest whistleblower in the National 
Security Agency’s history when he leaked over a million and a half documents.201 The first set of 
documents revealed the extent of the Agency’s surveillance of mobile phones in the United 
States.202 Another set of documents detailed a program called XKeyscore that allows analysts to 
search e-mails, browsing histories, and social media activity (information commonly called 
metadata) of millions of individuals with no prior authorization.203 In short, this program helps 
federal agents collect, monitor, and use against any person anything that person does on the 
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Internet.204 Snowden said that the program would let him wiretap anyone from anywhere with no 
more than a personal e-mail address.205 
 Snowden’s leaks ultimately revealed an international effort to create a global surveillance 
network.206 The United States, Britain, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland have all been involved at 
one level or another.207 All these countries have been involved in monitoring or accessing 
computer user information.208 Snowden’s leaks showed that everything a person does on the 
Internet or their mobile phone is or can easily be monitored with no particularized warrant or 
suspicion for a specific person. Proving, once and for all, that there is in fact, no actual privacy 
on the Internet or on a mobile phone. Currently, there is a circuit split over the constitutionality 
of the NSA’s collection of phone records.209 While a Washington judge compared the program 
to something from Orwell’s 1984, a judge in New York upheld the program for national security 
reasons.210 This means no one knows the fate of this program, similar programs, or privacy rights 
of the world’s citizens at this point in time.  
V. Analysis 
 In modern society, information is one of the most valuable commodities a person 
possesses. The value of information can be seen every day when identities are stolen for fraud. 
People use other peoples’ information to get credit cards or to invest or steal assets. The 
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information is highly sought after, not only by criminals and others who seek it for sinister 
purposes, but also by companies in the ways and for the purposes listed above. Companies use 
the information to target consumers more effectively and directly. But as the Snowden leaks 
reveal, the government also seeks personal information on a massive scale. The government uses 
and stores this information to track individuals in and out of the United States. While the 
information on most individuals will sit in massive databases never to see the light of day, some 
people will see the information used against them in court or at the very least in criminal 
investigations. While the constitutionality of the program is in question, what is not in question is 
the national outrage and debate it has sparked. Many people did not know the government kept 
such massive records and now the debate is over whether the government should even be 
allowed to compile so much personal data from private citizens.  
 With the ever-increasing capabilities of smartphones, such devices are becoming more 
like computers at an exponential rate. Computers are becoming exponentially more powerful and 
more integrated in to the every day life of Americans. It is more common to communicate by e-
mail than it is physical or “snail mail.” Online shopping is continuously growing in popularity. 
People are increasingly connected through online gaming and other instantaneous forms of 
communication and connectivity. Now instead of driving to an office or flying to another city, 
companies can conduct meetings through the Internet or phone lines. Because technology, 
especially the computer and the Internet, is becoming so integrated in to every day life, it has 
become nearly if not completely impossible to shut oneself off from it if someone wants to 
continue to be able to function in modern society. The nature of society is that people are forced 
to use computers and the Internet, all the while, having little to no protection for their private 
information. Just because this is the way things are, does not mean that it is the way they should 
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be. However, as of now, it seems not even the circuit courts can agree on how much personal 
information and privacy should be protected.  
 When dealing with the computer and the privacy rights implicated by a search of it, the 
courts have struggled to come up with a sufficient analogy. Early analogies compared the 
computer to filing cabinets. This is because the terminology is similar and the concept is easy to 
understand. A computer holds individual files. Those files are separate and distinct from one 
another even though they are all in one location. The problem is that the types of files a computer 
holds can be very different from the types of files someone puts in a file cabinet. Furthermore, 
computers now hold much more information than any filing cabinet can. Moreover, “metadata” 
poses a unique risk that a filing cabinet does not. A filing cabinet does not store how many times 
a file has been accessed, who accessed it, and what the person used the information for. A filing 
cabinet does not tell someone the last time it was opened or how long it was open. It does not tell 
someone where the people who used it came from or where they went. It does not connect to 
other filing cabinets and transfer sensitive information, such as credit card and social security 
numbers, while leaving a trail and a copy of the information transmitted. So the question is 
whether there is an appropriate analogy to the physical world that the court can employ.  
 When considering the amount and types of information a computer stores, how many 
different things a computer is used for in modern society, and how integrated into a person’s life 
a computer inevitably is, any analogy to a personal paper or effect seems to fall very short of the 
mark. It seems that a computer deserves more protection than any other possession in the world. 
Considering this, there are two other things listed in the Fourth Amendment that courts have 
historically, fiercely protected. There is a person’s physical body and a person’s home. No matter 
how integrated computers are in our lives, they are not part of our physical bodies (not yet at 
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least). On the other hand, as technology advances and the Internet becomes more indispensable, 
there is more discussion about “online presence.” There is a digital version of every person who 
ventures online. Should that digital body of information and data be treated like the physical 
body of a person? Should courts begin to look at information that comprises an online presence 
and analyze it along the same lines that they analyze physical intrusions? Is there a way to create 
a dividing line in the digital world that makes sense the way dividing lines in the physical world 
do? Or would they be more arbitrary and ineffective?  
 In addition to physical bodies however, the Fourth Amendment has always protected the 
home with fervor as well. Courts have repeatedly cited the “intimate details of the home” as the 
reason for this protection. Courts have discussed the fact that the home is where most of the 
decisions for the family are made. It is where most intimate moments occur. It is where people 
not only feel they are, but also that they should be, protected the most from intrusion. But 
computers and technology are changing the way families communicate. Instead of waiting until 
after school to get a note from a teacher when a child has acted up, parents can be e-mailed or 
texted immediately. Parents no longer have to be in the same room to make important family 
decisions. Bills are not viewed or paid in paper form anymore. Most are viewed and paid online, 
with every member of the family aware of the password, capable of accessing the information. 
Internet connected remotes and smartphone applications enable people with high electric bills to 
change the settings from across the street or across the Atlantic for that matter. A person’s and a 
family’s whole life can be accessed through their computer. All the intimate details of the home 
that the Framers were concerned with protecting can now be accessed on a family’s computer. Is 
the move to a more digital life one of the advancements in technology that caused the focus of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to shift from property interests to privacy expectations in the 
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first place? Does this advancement in technology warrant another shift in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence?  
 It is obvious that the filing cabinet analogy is obsolete. Is an analogy to the home or body 
more appropriate? Should a personal computer be compared to a home? If so, does that make its 
Internet connections more like streets? Just because a street brings you directly to the home does 
not mean it gives you the right to access the personal and intimate details the home possesses. 
Just like the Court forbid police officers from using advanced technology in Katz to view 
“intimate details of the home” from a public thoroughfare, should a court refuse to let law 
enforcement use computer programs from the internet to collect and access the same kind of 
information stored on a personal computer? Does the form of the information matter in this 
context or is it the substance that the Fourth Amendment should protect?  
 The Court has encountered this dilemma before with changing technologies. When 
wiretapping and technological surveillance became common, the Court decided it was the 
substance of the information that mattered under the law. It was a person’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy that determined whether the information was protected. However, in a 
world where computers and information stored on them are constantly monitored, can a person 
claim an actual expectation of privacy in digitally stored information anymore? Should a person 
be able to claim such an expectation? Would laws need to be rewritten or created to grant an 
expectation of privacy in a media where there currently is not one? Does it matter that people are 
being forced to join the digital revolution by the nature of society, whether or not they are 
comfortable with the effect of such a shift in ideology on their personal privacy?  
 The personal computer and devices with similar capabilities are inevitably intertwined in 
to every day life now. Whether a person wants privacy or not is irrelevant because almost 
30 
 
everyone needs to use digital resources to function in society. Is a Constitution that was written 
in a world without a digital element capable of being expounded so far as to protect digital 
rights? Are there digital rights?  
Conclusion 
 As integrated as computers are and as much sensitive information as they store, they 
should not be treated like any other effect a person owns. They should be sacrosanct. They 
should receive the highest constitutional protections. The framers emphasis on protecting the 
home, property, and bodies of individuals was not simply to protect them from physical 
intrusion. As the courts have recognized before, it was the intimate details possessed and stored 
in these places that the Framers were really trying to protect. This is why current legal 
conceptions of computers and digital presence are insufficient. If Congress refuses to step in, the 
way it did with wiretapping technologies, the Court should recognize the sanctity of the Framers 
intent again.  
 As Edward Snowden showed the world when he leaked the NSA documents, the 
government has already trampled on and disregarded any privacy interests a person may have in 
their digital information. It is because of this that the Court may not be able to wait for Congress 
to act. In addition, as Chief Justice John Marshal once so eloquently put it, “it is emphatically the 
province and duty of the Court to determine what the law is.” If there is any modern hope of 
finding privacy in a digital life, the Court must act sooner rather than later. The physical 
computer and Fourth Amendment warrant requirements are simply one piece of a larger, more 
complicated puzzle. When the pieces are put together in the future, the picture can be one that 
emphasizes individual rights and liberties, the way the Framers intended. On the other hand, the 
ultimate image could be one of government being able to constantly monitor and collect data 
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about its citizens in a way the framers never could have imagined. The technologies may be new 
and the issues seemingly more complicated than before, but the struggle between government 
power and individual rights is as old as society itself. The Founding Fathers tried to answer this 
question for our society long ago. They struck a balance for us that we have claimed to respect. 
Now more than ever it is important to determine whether we want to honor only their carefully 
chosen words, or their overall message as well.  
